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RESOLVING FEE DISPUTES AND LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS USING ADR
MARK RICHARD CUMMISFORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers have long debated how best to resolve fee disputes. The
debate, however, appears to assume that any alternative to arbitration
should be compared to a litigation model. Perhaps looking at the issue
from the perspective of the clients, rather than solely from a lawyer's
point of view, could shed some light on possible solutions that use a
model other than litigation. As one commentator suggests, "To
illustrate one reason why alternative resolution of a fee dispute may not
be as beneficial for the client as would appear at first blush, it is helpful
to ask a basic question about alternative dispute resolution-alternative
to what?"1 Writing as a young lawyer and as a former client mired in a
recent fee dispute, this Essay is offered to add to the ongoingstudy and
debate on this subject. It will explore the various methods used to
resolve fee disputes, and will offer an overall plan for changing the
approach to fee disputes.
Part II of this Essay considers the origin of fee disputes between
attorneys and clients, addressing the questions of why and when clients
do not pay. This Part will also discuss legal malpractice and its close
relation to fee disputes.! As one commentator pointed out, "It should
be of no surprise that attorney malpractice and fee disputes are often
found lurking in the same lair. In both malpractice and fee disputes, the
" B.A., University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee; J.D., Marquette University Law School.
The author is currently practicing at Blommer Law Office in Brookfield, Wisconsin, which
focuses primarily on real estate and bankruptcy law. As a real estate broker and Realtor@
since 1986, the author has been involved in over 400 real estate sale transactions. He serves
on the Board of Directors for the Greater Milwaukee Association of Realtors@ and is a
member of the Professional Standards Committee, which conducts arbitration and ethics
hearings to resolve disputes between Realtor@ members, and between Realtors@ and their
clients.
1. Jean Fleming Powers, Ethical Implications of Attorneys Requiring Clients to Submit
Malpractice Claims to ADR, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 638-39 (1997) (recognizing how fee
disputes and legal malpractice issues are often interrelated).
2. Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU
L. REV. 2005 (1993).
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client believes that he did not get what he paid for."3 Thus, any plan for
resolving fee disputes must also address and consider the various
problems raised by a client's allegations of legal malpractice.
Violations of the attorney ethical code are closely related to fee
disputes and often lead to malpractice actions.4 Disputes can arise for a
myriad of reasons, including scope of representation,5 competence, or
diligence.7 In addition, confidentiality may also become an issue in fee
disputes because attorneys may be allowed to breach certain
confidences in defense of a claim.'
Next, Part III of this Essay surveys the options available to clients
and attorneys involved in a fee dispute and whether alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) processes offer reasonable and desirable alternatives
to offensive or defensive litigation. When an attorney wants to collect
unpaid fees or when a client files a malpractice action or breach of
contract suit, the most obvious course of action may appear to be
litigation. Yet, other options exist for the parties. This discussion is
followed by Part IV, which looks specifically at arbitration as an
alternative to resolving disputes since some states have determined that
mandatory fee arbitration is the best method to bring resolution to fee
disputes.
In order to better assess whether mandatory fee arbitration is a
viable solution for Wisconsin, Part V of this Essay draws on the lessons
from other countries and states that have mandatory fee arbitration
programs or some other form of distinct fee dispute resolution program
in place. For example, England and Australia resolve fee disputes much
differently than the United States.9 In addition, Part V turns to the
systems in place for other professions and trades, such as organized real
estate, which mandates that its members arbitrate most disputes.'
Comparing how other systems resolve fee disputes with the current
practices of the legal community will help illustrate why arbitration or
3. Wendy C. Reed, Recent Development Saffer v. Willoughby, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 521,521 (1997).
4. For instance, ABA Model Rule 1.5 can become an issue in fee disputes. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.5 cmt. (2001) (listing the eight factors in determining the
reasonableness of a fee); WIs. Sup. Cr. R. 20 (adopting the following ABA Model Rules: 1.1
Competence, 1.2 Scope of Representation, 1.3 Diligence, 1.5 Fees, and 1.6 Confidentiality).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2 (2001).
6. Id. R. 1.1.
7. Id. R. 1.3.
8. Id. R. 1.6.
9. See infra Part V.A-B.
10. See infra Part V.C.
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litigation may not be the only options available to attorneys and clients
faced with a fee dispute.
Finally, Part VI of this Essay presents a proposed framework that
incorporates both a client's and an attorney's perspective. This Essay
concludes that it is important to allow the parties to choose whether
they negotiate, mediate, arbitrate, or litigate a fee dispute. Attorneys
and clients should have this same right as they do in any other dispute.
Any formal process implemented to resolve disputes between attorneys
and clients should be constructed to assist, rather than inhibit, the
parties in resolving their disputes without reverting to a litigation-type
forum.
II. THE ORIGIN OF ATrORNEY-CLIENT FEE DISPUTES
Why do clients neglect to pay their legal fees? Studies suggest that
fee disputes are not caused by the client's inability to pay." "Fee
[disputes are] most common in family law cases and cases where the
attorney and client have a one-time relationship ... and the client is
dissatisfied with the results. ,12
In order to help minimize disputes at the outset of the
representation, clients should review the original fee contract and
inform the lawyer about their concerns.' The clients should also
understand how legal fees are calculated. The Wisconsin Bar
Association website spells out for clients the eight factors that the court
considers when determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee.14
These factors reflect the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule
1.5, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted as Supreme Court
11. Linda Roberson, Fees, Fie, Foe, Fur What Family Lawyers Ought To Know About
Attorney's Fees, available at http:llwww.wisbar.orglconventionlarchive/ann97/outline4O.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
12. Id.
13. State Bar of Wisconsin, Fee Arbitration Program, available at http://www.wisbar.org
/bar/feearb.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Fee Arbitration Program].
Reasonableness is based primarily on factors such as the "time and effort required, as
documented by a time and charges bill .... [and] whether all the time and effort expended
were necessary." Roberson, supra note 11. "The experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorney" are also considered. Id. "The nature of the proceedings and the difficulty of the
issues.... [are] often used to reduce hourly charges." Id. "The results obtained" by the
attorney may also be a factor considered by the courts. Since courts often reduce reviewed
fees, attorneys should consider the benefits of arbitration. Id. Roberson points out
advantages to fee arbitration: "(i) Voluntary; (ii) Courts look upon it with favor; (iii) Informal
hearing; (iv) Takes less time than litigation; (v) No or minimal cost to either client or
attorneys; (vi) Some protection against malpractice claims." Id.
14. Fee Arbitration Program, supra note 13.
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Rule 20:1.5 on fees.'" These suggestions should help clients engage in a
fee arrangement that meets their needs. Lawyers often avail themselves
of the flexibility provided by flat fee and contingency fee arrangements
when arranging fees with clients. This flexibility allows an attorney and
client to reach a fee agreement that the client can honor in most cases.
Nevertheless, problems arise and clients who are involved in a fee
dispute must decide to fight or flee in a battle where they are an
underdog fighting against the legal system.16 Clients perceive that the
odds are stacked against them, which can leave them feeling powerless
and hopeless. The mere power imbalance alone may be enough to
dissuade many clients from engaging in litigation.
Clients who are dissatisfied with the handling of their case most
commonly cite inefficiencies such as the "[flailure to take advantage of
prior research and standardized document preparation."17 Additionally,
clients may refuse to pay fees due to a lack of understanding of the
billing process, especially when hourly fees are based on tenths of an
hour. Clients may also refuse to pay fees due to alleged legal
malpractice or ethical violations.
While lawyers may not be liable for honest errors of judgment,"8 they
may be liable for numerous other omissions. These can include the
following: failing to do minimal research before giving legal advice, 9
15. WIS. Sup. Cr. R. 20:1.5. The rule states in part:
Fees (a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id.
16. See discussion infra Part III.A.
17. Id.
18. See Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (N.C. 1954) (holding that the lawyer was
not liable for an honest error of judgment).
19. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693-94 (Minn.
1980).
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failing to file an appeal on behalf of jailed client," failing to give the
client advice with reasonable knowledge, skill and diligence,21 failing to
exercise due care that information given to a third party was correct, 2
failing to effectuate a client's instructions, or failing to observe obvious
standards of care that may amount to malpractice on the part of an
attorney.2
When an attorney commits malpractice, it is not unreasonable that
the attorney should forfeit his fees.2 While these disputes over fees tend
to get absorbed into the more serious malpractice issue, the fact remains
that attorneys must sometimes navigate a great body of law and ethics
before they can expect payment from a client.
Fortunately for attorneys, most disputes remain private and
confidential and do not become a matter of public record because they
are resolved without the intervention of formal court systems.26 As a
result, it is difficult to ascertain the number of actual fee disputes and
how they are resolved. Nevertheless, it is clear that fee disputes will
continue to arise in a variety of contexts and that the parties will have to
reach some type of resolution, either inside or outside the courtroom.
III. OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION
Perhaps the first and most important step toward improving the way
attorneys and clients resolve fee disputes is to focus on how an attorney
should resolve disputes with clients. It has been said that "[n]o single
20. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1303 (N.J. 1992) (finding an attorney
negligent for failure to give the client advice with reasonable knowledge, skill, and diligence).
22. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565-66 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
an attorney negligently failed to exercise due care to ensure that information given to a third
party was correct).
23. Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573, 577-78 (Wis. 1980) (holding that a attorney
negligently failed to effectuate a client's instructions regarding a mortgage).
24. George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822,828 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
25. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,232 (Tex. 1999). The Texas Supreme Court stated
"that whether an attorney must forfeit any or all of his fee for a breach of fiduciary duty to his
client must be determined by applying the rule as stated in section 49 of the proposed
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers and the factors we have identified." Id.
at 245. Further, the court stated that "the ultimate decision on the amount of any fee
forfeiture must be made by the court." Id.
26. Matthew J. Clark, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Pre-Dispute Agreements
Between Attorneys and Clients to Arbitrate Fee Disputes, 84 IOWA L. REV. 827, 837 (1999)
("[T]he client does not have to worry that information revealed to an attorney in confidence
will become part of the public record, and the attorney is able to rest easier knowing that the
arbitration process is much less likely to result in negative publicity.").
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issue between lawyer and client arises more frequently or generates
more public resentment than fee problems." ''  Focusing on what
affirmative steps an attorney ought to take toward resolving disputes
affects not only the relationship between the attorney and client
involved in a particular dispute, but it also affects how the public
perceives the legal profession. Therefore, it would behoove members of
the legal profession to examine the fee dispute resolution options that
do not involve the adversarial and negative aspects of litigation-style
dispute resolution. In order to flesh out some of the problems with the
present system used to resolve fee disputes, it is first necessary to
examine the dispute-resolution options currently used by attorneys and
clients. After reviewing current practices, it is important to consider
what options attorneys and clients ought to make available. Following
this discussion, included is a proposal to bring attorneys and clients
together to take advantage of these options.
Most lawyers have a notion of what options are available to them
when clients do not pay.' However, what options are available to a
client who wants to dispute fees charged by his or her lawyer? The
options that a client may have include the following: litigation, paying
the bill or doing nothing, filing a formal complaint with the Office of
Lawyer Regulation, negotiation, mediation, and mandatory or voluntary
arbitration.29 When costs and benefits associated with ADR methods
are compared with the costs and benefits associated with litigation, it
appears that the overall benefits for both parties do not rest in litigation,
but rather in some form of ADR. To illustrate this point, the following
will examine the options that may be available to an attorney and client
engaged in a fee dispute.
A. Litigation
Litigation is not an ideal course of action from the lawyer's point of
view." When an attorney instinctively resorts to litigation tactics to
27. Lester Brickman, Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 UTAH L.
REV. 277, 277 (considering the fiduciary obligations an attorney has to a client and the
fairness-in-fact standard used in fee agreements as well as the ethical obligations and
standards for judicial review of arbitration).
28. Attorneys may take an offensive approach towards the client's unpaid bill by sending
collection letters, ceasing work on the client's case, initiating collection actions, or filing a
small claims action. Attorneys may also act defensively by waiting, or deciding not to pursue
the client for payment. Powers, supra note 1, at 638.
29. Powers, supra note 1, at 637-38 (discussing the alternatives of resolving fee disputes).
30. C.W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.6.1 (1986) (writing that "[flee suits
can be ugly affairs").
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collect a debt, that attorney may be sourly surprised by the results. One
commentator has noted that "it seems plausible to suggest that such
[fee] disputes may frequently be triggered by the attorney's demand for
payment of his fee and fueled by the attorney's continuing attempts to
collect it., 31 Studies indicate that when an attorney files suit to collect
attorney fees,32 "such a suit virtually guarantees a counterclaim for
[legal] malpractice. 3 3  Moreover, litigation between attorneys and
clients reflects poorly upon the entire profession.34 Law is a profession
offering personal services to clients. No lawyer is likely to argue against
the proposition that at least some of their success can be attributed to
their own favorable reputation, positive relationships with clients, and
potential referral business from others.
At best, litigation impairs the lawyer's potential for referral business
from the client that the lawyer sues. At worst, the lawyer can lose the
fee dispute, as well as the lawyer's relationship with that client and the
people influenced by that client. Furthermore, the lawyer's reputation
may suffer, not only in the eyes of prospective clients, but in the eyes of
other lawyers. Consider the circumstance where the lawyer is also a
court commissioner, an active member of the bar, or participates in
some other highly visible role. Since litigation is public, the details
surrounding that lawyer's fee dispute will be disclosed to the lawyer's
colleagues, and it could result in irreparable damage to the lawyer's
position in the profession. Lawyers should also be concerned with the
effects of word-of-mouth advertising, especially in smaller towns with
intimate legal communities. Of course, a more practical and economical
concern is whether the lawyer should represent himself or hire another
lawyer. In the end, the litigation costs could exceed the recoverable
amount.35
From the client's perspective, litigation is probably as unattractive as
it is for the lawyer. "Even finding a local lawyer willing to handle a suit,
or testify as an expert witness, against another attorney in a fee case is
likely to be difficult."36 However, the pro se alternative of a client suing
31. Rau, supra note 2, at 2005-06 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 2014.
33. Id. at2017.
34. "Even in the best of scenarios the public relations value of a suit by an attorney
against one of his [or her] clients is likely to be very negative." Id.
35. Wis. STAT. §814.04(1) (1999-2000) (severely limiting the amount of attorney fees
that can be collected in small claims under $5,000).
36. Arthur W. Francis, Jr., How to Handle a Legal Malpractice Lawsuit, L. A. LAW.
June, 1989, at 19. From the lawyer's point of view, "it should be kept in mind that the client is
2002]
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their attorney for legal malpractice gives the lawyer the metaphorical
"home field advantage." Presumably, clients hire lawyers to navigate
and negotiate the formal legal system for them in the first place. A
client's subsequent decision to sue that same lawyer would require the
client to enter, now as a player, the same "game" he sought to avoid by
hiring the lawyer. This result is ironic, and not particularly practical.
Finally, a client must consider the privacy implications of suing his
lawyer. Because the ABA Model Rules allow lawyers to use certain
"confidential information" to defend against a claim,' a client might feel
inhibited from engaging his former lawyer in formal litigation to protect
his privacy.
B. Paying the Bill or Doing Nothing
A client may determine that the best course of action is to simply
pay the bill and complain, or take other action. Alternatively, a client
may respond to a fee dispute by simply not paying. Assuming those
same clients do not want to file a lawsuit against their former lawyer,
their best strategy may be to do nothing at all. This option gives clients
the ability to forgo offensive action and take a defensive posture. While
"[a] client who finds an attorney's fee excessive is likely to grumble and
then pay the bill anyway,"3 others simply may not pay. This option
could be exercised by waiting for some action from the collecting
attorney, or simply ignoring the repeated payment demand letters sent
by their former lawyer. However, by exercising this option, the client
risks being subjected to a lawsuit or a collection action brought by the
collecting attorney.
C. Complaint to the Office of Lawyer Regulation39
Theoretically, "the client who has been overcharged may resort to
the formal grievance machinery operated by the organized bar" or by
the state courts.+ In Wisconsin, the Supreme Court Rules created a new
lawyer regulation system, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (the OLR),
to replace the Board of Attorneys of Professional Responsibility.
41
a person who is willing to sue a prior attorney and would likely have no qualms about suing a
second attorney." Id. at 20.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2001).
38. Rau, supra note 2, at 2008.
39. See generally Wis. SUP. Cr. R. 21.001-.21.
40. See Rau, supra note 2, at 2009.
41. In Wisconsin, the OLR is responsible for "receiv[ing] and respond[ing] to inquiries
and grievances relating to attorneys licensed to practice law... in Wisconsin and .... is
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Chapters 21 and 22 of the Supreme Court Rules, which describe the
system for regulating the practice of law in Wisconsin, were redrafted at
the request of the Wisconsin Supreme Court justices after they reached
agreement in January 2000 on a tentative framework for lawyer
discipline. 2 The new framework was approved on May 22, 2000.41 The
OLR screens, investigates, and prosecutes cases." The Central Intake
Unit of the OLR takes calls from the public, conducts initial
investigations, and determines how to proceed.45  This may include a
referral for full investigation, a referral to the new Alternatives to
Discipline program, or dismissal.4 ' The District Investigative Committee
assists in the investigation of certain cases and ensures uniformity across
the state. The Preliminary Review Committee reviews investigations
and determines whether there is cause for the director to file a
complaint with the Wisconsin Supreme Court.48  A court appointed
attorney or reserve judge (referee) hears cases, makes disciplinary
recommendations to the supreme court, and approves the issuance of
private and public reprimands.4 The Board of Administrative
Oversight monitors the fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency of the
system and proposes substantive and procedural rules for consideration
by the supreme court."
Recourse to the OLR may be an effective option for a disgruntled
client as "no attorney threatened with a fee-based complaint can
completely ignore the existence of the bar's [or state's] grievance
responsible for the prosecution of disciplinary proceedings alleging attorney misconduct."
WIs. Sup. Cr. R. 21.02. District investigation committees can "resolve or adjust.., a dispute
between an attorney and a client or other attorney if the dispute does not involve
misconduct." Id. R. 21.06. The OLR "do[es] not represent the complaining person, the
attorney[,] ... the bar generally, or any other person or group." Id. R. 21.12. Instead, it
"represent[s] the interests of the [Wisconsin] [S]upreme [C]ourt and the public in the integrity
of the lawyer regulation system." Id.
42. Office of Lawyer Regulation-Synopsis, available at http://www.courts.state.wi.us (last
modified Oct. 25, 2001). (The rules and related documents are available on the Website or by
calling the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court at (608) 266-1880.)
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also WIS. SUp. Cr. R. 21 (governing "Enforcement of Attorney's Professional
Responsibility").
45. See Supreme Court Adopts Alternatives to Discipline Program, available at
http://www.courts.state.wi.uslmedia/presslintakel.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
46. Id.
47. The Office of Lawyer Regulation System, available at http://www.courts.
state.wi.us/olr/synopsis2.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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machinery or the possibility of formal hearings and an adverse
finding."5 Lawyers must take seriously any allegations made by a client,
especially those that could result in a disciplinary investigation, hearing,
or sanction. Defending such allegations is likely to be costly, time
consuming, and risky. More importantly, relationships usually suffer
and unintended consequences may develop beyond the scope of the
complaint itself.
"The overwhelming majority of attorney disciplinary proceedings
are in fact triggered by client complaints, 52 and in fact, "the primary
source of disciplinary caseload is third-party complaints."" Although a
client complaint is not always the correct forum for a fee dispute, it can
be a useful option for the client who also alleges that the attorney
committed ethical violations. Nevertheless, "[a]s a practical matter,
disciplinary action against an attorney who has charged an 'excessive
fee' is imposed in only the most blatant cases of abuse."5 4 Therefore, in
all but the most egregious cases, an attorney will likely be able to avoid
disciplinary action for their conduct relating to fee disputes.5
D. Negotiation
Clients can also decide to initiate negotiation over the disputed fee.
However, in many instances, clients may hesitate to enter into
negotiations concerning fee disputes due to the unequal bargaining
power between attorney and client. 6 Since an attorney is expected to
have more negotiation expertise, a client may feel that they are
confronted with having to face an expert at the negotiation table. A
client may seek to have an attorney represent them in the negotiation,
but similar to litigation, obtaining representation can become a major
obstacle for a client.57
Despite the imbalance in bargaining power, negotiation is probably
the most popular method of resolving disputes between attorneys and
51. See Rau, supra note 2, at 2014.
52. See id. at 2009-10.
53. Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional
Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 919,946.
54. Rau, supra note 2, at 2012.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 2018-20; see also Powers, supra note 1, at 629-32 (discussing disparate
bargaining positions between attorneys and clients as one argument militating against the use
of ADR in fee disputes); Clark, supra note 26, at 850-51 (discussing the disparity in
bargaining power between attorneys and clients in the context of pre-dispute agreements).
57. See generally Francis, supra note 36.
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their clients.58  One empirical study9 reported how attorneys resolved
fee disputes and suggested that attorneys and clients prefer to negotiate
a resolution. Of those surveyed, "73.6 percent reported that in 'all' or
'most' cases [of fee disputes,] they had 'reach[ed] a final agreement on
the disputed fees after discussion and negotiation with the client.
'
",
60
When negotiation failed, 69.3 percent of responding attorneys reported
that they took no further action to collect the unpaid fee."' This study
suggests that even though the bargaining power may favor the attorney,
most attorneys will have the incentive to reach a settlement with the
client because the option to litigate has too many negative
consequences. However, reaching resolution may be even more likely if
a third party is allowed to facilitate the negotiation, such as in
mediation.
E. Mediation
"Mediation is negotiation carried out with the assistance of a third
party. " 2 It is a voluntary process where the mediator "has no power to
impose an outcome on disputing parties."6 3 Instead, mediators attempt
to help the parties reach their own solution by employing a variety of
techniques to change the dynamics of the negotiation.6 Mediators work
as a guide, leading negotiators through the formal mediation process
and towards a resolution.6
Generally, mediation is not a controversial process unless
participation is mandatory, which in many ways contradicts the accepted
definition of mediation as a voluntary process. Although attendance at
mediation is not usually mandatory, some courts encourage litigants to
58. See Rau, supra note 2, at 2019.
59. Id. The study included a total sample of 3379 Texas law firms, drawn from the
database of law firms in IOLTA (Interest On Lawyer's Trust Account) records. Id. at 2007
n.2. "All of the firms in the database with two or more attorneys were surveyed." Id. The
remainder of the sample (approximately 42%) consisted of solo practitioners. Id. "1,794
responses were received for an overall response rate of 53%." Id.
60. Id. at 2019.
61. Id.
62. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 123 (3d ed. 1999).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Various negotiating techniques that are often used by the parties during the
mediation session are outlined in the popular book Getting to Yes. ROGER FISHER &
WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed.
1991).
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use the free or low cost mediation services that are available during the
early stages of litigation." In some jurisdictions, the courts sponsor
mediation,67 while in others, courts mandate mediation and other forms
of ADR.68 In Wisconsin, for example, "a judge may... order the parties
to select a settlement alternative," which may "include a requirement
that the parties participate personally in the settlement alternative." 9
Court-mandated ADR can pave the road to settlement. However, true
to the definition of mediation, mediated outcomes or agreements are
still reached voluntarily, even in situations where attendance and
participation is mandatory.
Of course, attorneys and clients can instead choose to use private
mediators. However, even if both parties choose private mediation,
they still need to agree on who will serve as the mediator and who will
pay for the services.0 Unfortunately, even these simple decisions
require some degree of negotiation, which may or may not inhibit
parties from getting to the table. Therefore, agreeing to mediate
through a pre-dispute agreement could address who will pay for the
mediation and how a mediator will be chosen.
66. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS: ABRIDGED EDITION 178 (Leonard L.
Riskin & James E. Westbrook eds., 1998).
67. In Wisconsin, the small claims courts in Milwaukee County and Waukesha County
have a voluntary mediation program available to litigants. These are only two of the many
court-sponsored mediation programs available throughout the country. Programs can and do
differ. For example, in Milwaukee County, litigants represented by attorneys are allowed
free access to the mediation program. Law students who are enrolled for credit in the
Mediation Clinic conduct the mediations in the Milwaukee program. Professor Janine Geske,
former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice, and volunteer practitioners supervise the student
mediators. In Waukesha County, volunteer practitioners conduct the mediation program,
which is open only to litigants appearing pro se. See Alternative Dispute Resolution, at
http://www.law.mu.eduladr/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2002) (discussing the alternative
dispute resolution programs available to Marquette law students).
68. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 62, at 365-404.
69. WiS. STAT. § 802.12 (1999-2000). The statute provides in relevant part:
(2)(a) A judge may, with or without a motion having been filed, upon determining
that an action or proceeding is an appropriate one in which to invoke a settlement
alternative, order the parties to select a settlement alternative as a means to attempt
settlement. An order under this paragraph may include a requirement that the
parties participate personally in the settlement alternative. Any party aggrieved by
an order under this paragraph shall be afforded a hearing to show cause why the
order should be vacated or modified. Unless all of the parties consent, an order
under this paragraph shall not delay the setting of the trial date, discovery
proceedings, trial or other matters addressed in the scheduling order or conference.
Id.
70. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS: ABRIDGED EDITION, supra note 66, at 178.
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Because mediation does not impose an outcome on either party, it
offers both parties the freedom to provide input and chart their own
course toward a resolution. This avoids the uncertainty, costs, risks, and
other disadvantages associated with arbitration and litigation. When
attempted, mediation can often mend, or prevent further damage to, the
relationship between the attorney and client. Thus, mediation may be a
logical first step for both parties.
F. Arbitration and Pre-Dispute Agreements
"Arbitration has been an alternative to litigation for hundreds of
years,"" and it is widely used. Arbitrations are "private resolution
procedure[s]" and therefore can have various elements, and be
conducted in different fashions." Of the ADR methods, arbitration is
the one that most closely resembles court adjudication because "proofs
and arguments are submitted to a neutral third party. 3
Arbitration is used to resolve a variety of disputes arising in the
following contexts: construction trade, between consumers and
manufacturers, between family members, in medical malpractice, in the
securities context, in matters related to civil rights, between
communities and their members, within professional sports, and
between attorneys and clients.74 Additionally, "95 percent of all
collective bargaining contracts contain a provision for final and binding
arbitration. "75 In each of these contexts, the individual voluntarily
waives the right to a jury trial to secure more immediate benefits under
the contract.
Agreements made between attorneys and clients are no exception.
A client may voluntarily waive her right to a jury trial in the event that
there is a fee dispute in order to obtain the more immediate benefit of
representation by the contracting attorney under a contingency fee.
Various commentators criticize the use of such agreements, arguing that
in many cases the client does not have the opportunity to bargain for the
pre-dispute agreement.7 ' Therefore, the issue of bargaining power may
be relevant to a court considering the enforceability of a pre-dispute
provision. When properly bargained for, however, arbitration can be
71. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 62, at 233.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 26, at 850.
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effectively used to resolve attorney-client disputes.
A mandatory arbitration clause could also be an early step employed
by attorneys and their clients.' Arbitration clauses are written into a
variety of contracts, including international contracts, consumer
contracts, employment contracts, service contracts, and professional and
personal service contracts.78  Some attorneys have attempted to
incorporate arbitration clauses into retainer agreements.79  Such
agreements are often referred to as "pre-dispute agreements. "o
However, attorneys must exercise great care when utilizing pre-
dispute agreements. The enforceability of such agreements rests upon
whether the client gave informed and voluntary consent to the
provision." The courts are reluctant to uphold an attorney's petition to
compel arbitration unless the court believes that the client clearly
waived the right to a jury trial. 2 As the California Court of Appeals
stated, ''[T]here is nothing inherently improper about an arbitration
agreement between a lawyer and client which extends to malpractice
claims, [but the client must be] fully advised of the possible
consequences of that agreement."'83  Unfortunately, "it appears pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate malpractice claims do not have much
support in the law."84 The law may disfavor pre-dispute agreements
requiring clients to arbitrate fee disputes in part because once the
arbitration outcome is final, it is not subject to judicial review."' This
77. Id. at 841.
78. Rau, supra note 2, at 2024-27.
79. Clark, supra note 26, at 852.
80. Id. at 841.
81. Id. at 844 (raising the issue of the protection needed to ensure that the decision to
arbitrate a fee dispute is informed and voluntary, and reinforces the importance of the
attorney's fiduciary duty to advance and protect the client's best interest).
82. Id. at 853 ("[L]egal analysts read [Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson] as 'implicitly
approving a properly drafted arbitration agreement,' so long as an agreement is clear as to its
scope and properly discloses to the client that arbitration involves the loss of the right to a
trial by jury.").
83. Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr. 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Cal.
Compendium on Prof'l Responsibility, pt. HA, Formal Op. 1977-47, p. 1).
84. John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Malpractice and the Multistate Law Firm: Supervision of
Multistate Offices; Firms as Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to
Arbitrate Client Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 967, 991 (1995) (stating that "[t]he
two issues at the heart of every fee arbitration procedure are whether attorneys and clients
can agree to submit fee disputes to arbitration before the dispute arises, and whether the
arbitration may consider malpractice issues").
85. Clark, supra note 26, at 839 ("[M]ost arbitration decisions are binding and not
subject to review."); Brickman, supra note 27, at 294 ("[T]he substance of arbitration awards
is generally not reviewable.").
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means that in most cases, the client forfeits the opportunity to seek any
kind of judicial relief. Although arbitration itself can be useful,
attorneys should carefully implement pre-dispute agreements.
1. History of Arbitration of Attorney-Client Disputes
"Until the last decade, arbitration has not, however, made significant
inroads in resolving disputes between attorneys and clients.86 Recently,
however, arbitration has gained more attention as being a possible, if
not the preferred, method of resolving disputes between attorneys and
clients." As one author explained, "the proliferation of attorney-client
disputes has changed the profession's perspective towards the use of
[ADR]. The major shift in the profession has been the push towards the
use of arbitration in resolving attorney-client fee disputes. '
Nevertheless, the trend towards using arbitration is controversial. Most
of the controversy revolves around whether a client, or attorney, should
be forced to waive their right to a jury trial by agreeing to mandatory
arbitration.89  Many question whether it is tolerable under any
circumstances that a party should be denied the right to a jury trial.' °
Despite this controversy, most courts uphold a party's right to agree to
mandatory arbitration.9
2. Arbitration and Claims of Legal Malpractice
Disputes over fees and legal malpractice are often interrelated."
Often, fee disputes flow from a client's belief that the attorney engaged
in some type of legal malpractice. Withholding fees is sometimes an
informal way for a client to make a malpractice-like claim against an
86. Dzienkowski, supra note 84, at 989.
87. Id. at 990.
88. Id.
89. Clark, supra note 26, at 838-39 ("[T]he most critical safeguard forfeited by a party
who opts for arbitration over litigation is the loss of the right to a trial by jury.").
90. However, some have questioned whether a right to a jury trial necessarily exists even
in absence of an agreement to arbitrate. In re Application of LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1273-75
(N.J. 1981); see also M. David LeBrun, Annotation, Validity of Statute or Rule Providing for
Arbitration of Fee Disputes Between Attorneys and their Clients, 17 A.L.R. 4th 993 (1982 &
Supp. 2001).
91. See Rau, supra note 2, at 2025-26 ("While the traditional attitude of judges towards
arbitration was one of considerable hostility, statutes enacted in most jurisdictions have
completely reversed the common-law position on arbitration and have made executory
agreements to arbitrate enforceable.").
92. See Powers, supra note 1, at 638-39 (explaining that fee disputes and legal
malpractice issues are often interrelated).
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attorney. In many cases, clients may lack the necessary skills to analyze
whether the attorney has in fact committed malpractice.' For this
reason, clients may be hesitant to bring a formal malpractice claim
against an attorney, even though the services the attorney provided
appear wholly inadequate to the client.
The interplay between fee dispute arbitration and malpractice was
the subject of the New Jersey Supreme Court case of Saffer v.
Willoughby.94 In Saffer, a disgruntled client refused to pay fees to his
lawyer and alleged legal malpractice against him." The issue of whether
the client was liable to his attorney for legal fees went to arbitration
according to the terms of the fee agreement between the client and his
attorney." The malpractice claim, however, was filed in the trial court.'
The attorney was successful at arbitration, but the court stayed the
arbitration award pending the outcome of the malpractice suit." The
court recognized that arbitration was better suited to address issues
related to fee disputes, not malpractice." Even though a final decision
was issued in the arbitration, the practical outcome of the arbitration
decision hinged on the outcome of the malpractice action pending in the
courts.
The attorney relied on arbitration to resolve his fee dispute, but the
court made the outcome of the arbitration contingent upon there being
no legal finding of malpractice on the part of the attorney." According
to one commentator, "From the client's point of view, the court's
decision applied common sense."10' To have the outcome of one impact
the other, even though the two are decided in completely different
forums, makes the resolution of such claims needlessly complex and
inserts a great deal of uncertainty between attorneys and clients as to
how fee disputes will eventually be resolved. In addition, the approach
adopted in Saffer involved two separate actions, one for legal
malpractice, and another for the fee dispute. Conducting two separate
93. See generally Reed, supra note 3, at 522.
94. 670 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1996).
95. Id. at 529.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 533.
99. Id. at 531.
100. Id. at 534.
101. Reed, supra note 3, at 524 (discussing the interplay between fee disputes and legal
malpractice when a court stays an arbitration award pending the outcome of a malpractice
case in court).
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proceedings when the two might easily be resolved together seems
wasteful and more costly than necessary. Thus, Saffer clearly illustrates
a need to design a system that can effectively deal with the resolution of
fee disputes and legal malpractice.
IV. MANDATORY ARBITRATION FOR FEE DISPUTES?
Currently, eight states require lawyers to participate in mandatory
fee arbitration,ln and in some states, the bar associations and the courts
sponsor voluntary fee arbitration programs.'O° While the ABA Model
Rules encourage lawyers to use such programs,1"4 not all lawyers have
embraced arbitration.
Wisconsin does not currently require lawyers to participate in
mandatory arbitration for fee disputes; however, in March 2000, there
was a push for mandatory arbitration. Mandatory fee arbitration would
require an attorney engaged in a fee dispute with his or her client to
submit to arbitration at the request of the client."°  One Wisconsin
lawyer, Gerald Sternberg, petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court to
adopt his proposal to require all Wisconsin lawyers to submit to
mandatory fee arbitration.1 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however,
denied the petition 7 and instead called for a study of mandatory fee
arbitration." Wisconsin state statutes still do not require attorneys to
submit to arbitration or mediation procedures established by the state
102. Mandatory Fee Arbitration, 13 THE COMPLEAT LAW., Spring 1996, at 10 (reporting
that nine states and the District of Columbia have mandatory fee arbitration rules).
103. The Milwaukee Bar Association and the Wisconsin Bar Association both have
voluntary fee dispute programs. See Resolution of Fee Disputes Committee, available at
http:lwww.wisbar.orglcommittees/cazOO/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002); MBE Fee
Arbitration Program, available at http'/www.milwbar.orgtpublic/FeeArb.html (last visited
Feb. 25,2002).
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCr R. 1.5 cmt. (2001). "If a procedure has been
established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure
established by the bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it." Id.
105. In the Matter of the Petition to Create a Fee Arbitration System, Amended Order No.
00-15, WIS. SUP. Cr. R. Ch. 14 (Proposed Draft, Apr. 6, 2001), available at
http:lwww.wisbar.orglcommittees/cazO0/farbres.html.
106. Court Considers Mandatory Fee Arbitration, INSIDE THE BAR (State Bar of
Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin) (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.wisbar.
org/newslettter/2001/02/ccmfa.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
107. Court Denies Petition, Calls for Study of Mandatory Fee Arbitration, WIs. LAW.,
Apr. 2001, at 9.
108. Id.; see also Supreme Court Seeks Volunteers to Study Fee Arbitration, available at
http:/www.wisbar.orglnewscenter/gennews/2001/scsvts.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
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bar, but Wisconsin judges can refer fee dispute litigants to ADR.'O,
Two competing views have emerged on this subject. Supporters of
using mandatory fee arbitration to resolve attorney client fee disputes
argue that litigation only works "to engender bitterness [towards
lawyers] and a plethora of malpractice counterclaims."" 0 According to
this logic, "[t]he ethical, competent attorney has nothing to fear by
submitting to a fee arbitration forum." '' Opponents of mandatory fee
arbitration, however, are concerned that such a system potentially
violates an individual's constitutional right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment.1
2
The Wisconsin Bar Committee on the Resolution of Fee Disputes
published Fee Arbitration Rules and recommended that the bar
support, in principle, the concept of mandatory arbitration."3 The
Committee, however, opposed Sternberg's petition because it found
certain procedural problems with the petition's proposal."' Instead, the
Committee suggested that "the State Bar's existing program be revised
as a mandatory program."115  In response to the committee
109. WIS. STAT. § 802.12(2)(a) (1999-2000). This statute states in part: "A judge may,
with or without a motion having been filed, upon determining that an action or proceeding is
an appropriate one in which to invoke a settlement alternative, order parties to select a
settlement alternative as a means to attempt settlement." Id.
110. Byron D. Brown, Restoring Faith in the Attorney/Client Relationship: Alaska's
Mandatory Fee Arbitration, 1998 J. DisP. RESOL. 95, 103 (discussing Alaska's mandatory fee
arbitration rule).
111. Id.
112. LeBrun, supra note 90.
113. Draft Report of the Committee on the Resolution of Fee Disputes, available at
http://www.wisbar.orglcommittees/cazOO/crespet.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
Draft Report].
114. Id.
115. Id. Commenting on its jurisdiction in fee disputes the committee has stated:
[t]he pendency of a lawsuit shall deprive the committee of jurisdiction over a dispute
unless a court requests the involvement of the committee and parties sign the
agreement for binding arbitration. It shall be the duty of the committee to
encourage the amicable resolution of fee disputes falling within its jurisdiction and,
in the event such resolution is not achieved, to arbitrate and finally determine such
disputes.
Committee on the Resolution of Fee Disputes: Fee Arbitration Rules, available at
http://www.wisbar.orgfbar/feearbrules.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Committee
on the Resolution of Fee Disputes: Fee Arbitration Rules]. See also Court denies petition, Calls
for Study of Mandatory Fee Arbitration, available at http'J/www.wisbar.
org/committees/caz00/cdpc0l.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Study of
Mandatory Fee Arbitration]. The Wisconsin State Bar opposed Sternberg's petition:
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recommendations, the Wisconsin Supreme Court sought volunteers to
study mandatory fee arbitration.116
This growing support suggests a trend is underway towards
mandating the use of arbitration in fee disputes. 17 Wisconsin is just one
example. Other states already use mandatory fee arbitration as a means
of resolving fee disputes. 8 One article about Alaska's approach
suggests that mandatory-fee arbitration restores faith in the attorney-
client relationship. 9 The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that state courts
could determine procedures for resolving fee disputes1 m Alaska state
bar rules have been praised as being effective and efficient. Alaska even
includes lay people on the hearing panels.1  Similarly, Wisconsin also
invites non-lawyers to serve on lawyer regulation committees.
There are many arguments in support of mandatory fee dispute
resolution, as well as many against it." Proponents argue that the
State Bar President-elect Gerlad Mowris told the court that the Board of Governors
unanimously opposed the petition but supported the study of mandatory fee
arbitration in specific cases. Mowris said that if the court determines that there is a
demonstrated need, the State Bar would like to be involved in designing a workable
solution.
Id.
116. Study of Mandatory Fee Arbitration, supra note 115. The following response was
elicited from one supreme court justice regarding the decision to study mandatory arbitration
of fee disputes:
In the open conference following the hearing, Justice Patrick Crooks said that the
courts' decision to study mandatory fee arbitration is not a criticism of what current
volunteers-lawyers and public members-are doing. Justice Jon Wilcox agreed.
"Things are working, and if there is a glitch, we'll find it and fix it."
Id.
117. James Peterson, Fee Arbitration: An Effective Alternative to Litigation, WIS. LAW.,
Aug. 1994, at 17.
118. Brown, supra note 110, at 97 ("The Alaska Supreme Court followed the ABA's
recommendations, and by order, the court established a mandatory fee arbitration system in
1974.").
119. See generally id. at 95.
120. J. Catherine Bramlage et al., Year in Review: Alaska Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals Year in Review 1996,14 ALASKA L. REv. 165,189-90 (1997).
121. Id see also ALASKA BAR R. 34(a), 37(c), available at http.//www.alaskabar.org
/library/allbarrules.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,2002).
122. Draft Report, supra note 113. The report concludes:
Reasons cited in favor of mandatory fee arbitration
Improve communications with clients and take the fee dispute out of the home
ground of the attorney, good public relations, lawyers in general lose control of the
process, jury trial is overstated
Reasons cited in opposition
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profession would benefit from better public relations if there was a
requirement for fee dispute arbitrations.' 3 Specifically, proponents
argue that if arbitration of fee disputes was required, the public would
have the peiception that lawyers no longer control the process of
resolving fee disputes. Finally, many proponents argue that the right to
a jury trial is overstated.'2 4
Most of the opposition to mandatory arbitration concerns the denial
of a jury trial for clients involved in a fee dispute.2' Additionally,
opponents argue that mandatory arbitration of fee disputes could lead
to an increase in frivolous challenges to legal fees, and consequently
result in a decrease in affordable legal services.'u Another argument
against mandatory fee arbitration is that it does little to change the
public's perception that lawyers will protect each other.IV
Opponents to a statutory requirement argue that if fee arbitration
were mandated, lawyers should not be the only professionals to be
impacted.'2 Donald Victor Kozlovsky, a Wisconsin lawyer, captured the
essence of the controversy best when he said, "Just as it is offensive to
many to bind a client to mandatory fee arbitration via a retainer [pre-
dispute] agreement provision, so too is it offensive to many to so bind a
lawyer via a mandate from the Wisconsin Supreme Court."' 29 According
to the report, opponents suggest that mediation should be required as an
Deprives jury trial, may increase frivolous challenges to fees, why only lawyers?,
may increase costs and decrease affordable legal services, opposition to mandates,
require fee mediation instead, must bind both parties, may further alienate clients
Recommendations
Support in principle the concept of mandatory arbitration, oppose Sternberg's
petition, current program should be the basis for any mandatory program.
Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
126. Draft Report, supra note 113.
127. As a real estate broker, the author has served on many fee arbitration panels
charged with hearing and settling disputes between cooperating Realtors®, and between
Realtors® and their clients. Oddly, although public perception might indicate that Realtors®
protect each other in these mandatory arbitrations, the author has found that to be false. In
fact, the arbitration panels (and ethics hearing panels) that he has served on and experienced
seem to be much more strict about enforcing the rules against each other. Like law,
organized real estate is largely self-regulated.
128. Draft Report, supra note 113.
129. Donald V. Kozlovsky, The Case for Voluntary Fee Arbitration, available at
http://www.wisbar.org/committees/cazO0/cvfa.html (last visited Jan. 26,2002).
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alternative.3"
V. COMPARISONS TO OTHER STATES, COUNTRIES, AND PROFESSIONS
Alaska,131 California,3 Maine,13 ' New Jersey, T' New York,'35 North
Carolina,'36 South Carolina,'- and Wyoming1'3 all have mandatory fee
arbitration programs. Georgia, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and
Washington are investigating the use of such programs."' Although the
programs differ from each other in some respects, all of the states have a
similar approach for the resolution of fee disputes. However, in
countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, fee disputes are
settled much differently.
A. Comparison to the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, "There are two ways [a client] may be able
to have [a solicitor's] bill checked to see if it is fair and reasonable.""'40
One way is through "the remuneration certificate procedure[,] [which] is
a free service.' 4' If a client thinks a bill is too high, he is encouraged to
contact the solicitor as soon as possible.'42 If the client and solicitor
cannot come to an agreement about the fee, the client must write a
letter to the solicitor requesting a remuneration certificate.'43 Strict time
limits apply to this process." The law society seeks to "complete 85%
of remuneration certificate applications within three months, 95%
within six months and the remaining 5% within twelve months.' 14' A
130. Draft Report, supra note 113.
131. ALASKA BARR. 40.
132. CAL. BAR. R., MANDATORY FEE. ARB. GUIDELINES § II.
133. ME. R. BAR R. 9.
134. N.J. CT. R. 1:20A-3.
135. N.Y. STANDARDS & ADMIN. POLY § 137.6.
136. N.C. BARR. SUBCHAP. 1B, § .0209.
137. S.C. APP. CT. R. 416,2.
138. Wyo. FEE DisP. RESOL. R. 6.
139. Mandatory Fee Arbitration, supra note 102, at 10.
140. How Do I Get My Bill Checked?, available at http:www/lawsociety.co.uk/dcs/
fourth tier.asp?section_id=3687 (last visited Jan. 31, 2002). In the United Kingdom, a
solicitor is a lawyer that practices law outside of the courtroom. Id. Conversely, a barrister is
a lawyer that appears in court. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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client can also request an assessment, a process by which the bill is
assessed by the courts.1" Assessments may also force clients to incur
additional court costs. 147 Strict time limits apply, requiring application
within one to twelve months.
148
Although both methods offer clients assistance when disputing fees,
the law society in England suggests that clients seek representation by
another solicitor.'49 This raises the same issues inherent in our current
system. The system does appear to have a procedure in place that
fosters conciliation early in the process. The law society offers
comprehensive suggestions, not only for handling complaints, but also
for setting up model complaint procedures in law offices.'
B. Comparison to Australia
The Australian State of New South Wales classifies fee disputes as
consumer disputes and uses an assessment, similar to the United
Kingdom.'51 Clients who feel that they have been overcharged "have a
right to have [their] bill assessed by an independent lawyer, appointed
by the Supreme Court, skilled in the area of legal work done."'12 The
assessment process is conducted like a court case, but in writing and
without the need to go to court.' The assigned lawyer may decline to
assess the bill if the parties "entered into a valid costs agreement ... and
[the] costs agreement states the amount of costs [the] solicitor will
charge," which may or may not preclude some clients from filing
complaints."' The application fee for assessment is payable to the
supreme court. 5 The fee is $100 AUD, 6 or 1%, of the amount unpaid
or in dispute, "whichever is more."'s
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Professional Responsibilities and Regulation: Solicitors' Fees, available at
http://www.lawsocnsw.asn.au/profreg/solicitorsjfees.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. AUD stands for Australian Dollars. The current exchange rate would make the
value about $52 United States dollars. See ExchangeRate.com, at http'/www.exchangerate.
com/quickscalculator.html?amountfrom=100.00&calc._short_fromiso=AUD&calc__short_
to_iso=USD&Submit=Convert (last visited Mar. 4,2002).
157. Professional Responsibilities and Regulation: Solicitors'Fees, supra note 151.
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The law society of New South Wales makes information available
about Solicitor's Fees and "Professional Responsibilities and
Regulation" on its website.15 Mediation is also available for disgruntled
clients."5 9 They can file a complaint with the Office of the Legal Services
Commissioner, but not as a "proper way to obtain an independent
assessment of a lawyer's costs.lW The Family Court has different rules
with regard to legal costs, and a variety of other resources are available
through the legal system in Australia."' Although an in-depth analysis
of these resources is beyond the scope of this discussion, the Australian
legal system model could be considered as one way to benefit American
clients and lawyers. The use of assessments appears to be fair, effective,
and efficient.
C. Comparison to Realtors
In the real estate profession, Realtors®, by virtue of their
membership in a trade association, are mandated to participate in
binding arbitration. 2 The National Association of Realtors'® Code of
Ethics requires members to arbitrate disputes between each other.63 It
also obligates members to arbitrate disputes when non-member
customers or clients initiate arbitration," unless all parties opt out in
writing, or if the Realtor@ is acting as a principal in the transaction."'
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See generally Susan Pattison, Costs Agreements in the Family Court, LAW Soc'y J.,
Oct. 1995, at 22, available at http://www.lawsocnsw.asn.au/resources/lsj/archive/
oct1995/22_1.html.
162. Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice of the National Association of Realtors,
available at httpl/www.kaarmls.concoe.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002). Article 17 provides:
In the event of contractual disputes or specific non-contractual disputes as defined in
Standard of Practice 17-4 between Realtors associated with different firms, arising
out of their relationship as Realtors, the Realtors shall submit the dispute to
arbitration in accordance with the regulation of their Board or Boards rather than
litigate the matter. In the event clients of Realtors wish to arbitrate contractual
disputes arising out of real estate transactions, Realtors shall arbitrate those disputes
in accordance with the regulations of their Board, provided the clients agree to be
bound by the decision.
Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 17-2. "Article 17 does not require Realtors to arbitrate in those
circumstances when all parties to the dispute advise the Board in writing that they choose not
to arbitrate before the Board." Id.
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Moreover, "The filing of litigation and refusal to withdraw from it by
Realtors in an arbitrable matter constitutes a refusal to arbitrate."'67
In the spirit of the landmark Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
case, 68  states such as Wisconsin enforce written arbitration
agreements. 9  Such agreements are "presumptively valid" unless
"invalidity is shown by clear and convincing evidence."70 Specifically
related to real estate brokers, even those who are not Realtor®
members, a Wisconsin statute makes agreements to arbitrate real estate
transaction disputes binding and enforceable:
A provision in any written agreement between a purchaser or
seller of real estate and a real estate broker, or between a
purchaser and seller of real estate, to submit to arbitration any
controversy between them arising out of the real estate
transaction is valid, irrevocable and enforceable except upon any
grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
agreement."
Statutes like this make it clear that pre-dispute arbitration clauses
will be held valid, irrevocable, and enforceable unless revoked by the
court. Thus, pre-dispute agreements may be a viable method of
preventing and resolving fee-disputes.
VI. FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW PLAN
Any formal process implemented to resolve disputes between
attorneys and clients should assist both parties, not inhibit them. One
author's plan suggests that we "Scrap the Disciplinary 'Enforcement'
166. Id. at 17-3. "Realtors, when acting solely as principals in a real estate transaction,
are not obligated to arbitrate disputes with other Realtors absent a specific written agreement
to the contrary." Id.
167. Id. at 17-1.
168. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that the
compulsory nature of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement does not render the agreement
unenforceable on grounds of coercion or not being voluntary).
169. Gerl v. Steans, No. 95-2602 (Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 1996) (noting that when the
client submitted the fee dispute to arbitration, "Arbitrators found that the clause regarding
costs and disbursements was ambiguous," but since the client "did not object, she implicitly
agreed to [the attorney's] interpretation of the agreement.").
170. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dists. v. Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Ass'n, 287 N.W.2d 131,
135 (Wis. 1980).
171. WIS. STAT. § 788.015 (1999-2000).
172. Dzienkowski, supra note 84, at 989. See generally Clark, supra note 26 (discussing
in detail the use of pre-dispute agreements).
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Model [and] Treat Lawyering Like Any Other Business" and that
"Legal Malpractice is the Most Effective Form of Lawyer
Regulation."'73
A new plan should utilize arguments on both sides of the issue and
take into consideration the client's perspective. Plan developers should
also consider a variety of factors such as: public perception, public trust,
the right to a jury trial, ADR methods, agency law, law and economics
efficiency theory,74 current and proposed Restatements (Third) of Law
Governing Lawyers,'75 Restatements (Second) of Agencyy rules and
programs currently in use,17 and programs used in other similar
situations, such as the EEOC model of resolving discrimination
complaints.178
An overall plan to handle fee disputes in the future might look like
this:
1. Create a multidisciplinary summit team or committee to
brainstorm ideas.
Lawyers. This category could include representatives from various
areas of law and specialties including: a litigation attorney, an ADR
specialist, a supervising attorney, a state agency specialist, a former
173. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2583,2591,2600 (1996).
174. Developments in the Law: Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1674 (1994). This article concludes that "the threat of too much liability
might reduce the activity level of competent attorneys to inefficient levels." Id. "In addition,
economically efficient liability shifting devices might be unfair or unethical. Lawmakers and
courts considering lawyer's responses to liability should weigh carefully the effects of their
decisions in reaching the proper balance of interests." Id.
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996). The following sections of this Restatement are also pertinent: Duty of
Care to Clients § 72 (Tentative Draft Mar. 21, 1995), Standard of Care § 74 (Tentative Draft
Apr. 7, 1994), Causation and Damages § 75 (Final Proposal Apr. 6, 1998), and Civil Liability
to Client Other than for Malpractice § 76 (Tentative Draft Mar. 21, 1997).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958) (stating that "[a]n agent is
entitled to no compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty
of loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a wilful [sic] and deliberate breach of his contract of
service, he is not entitled to compensation even for properly performed services for which no
compensation is apportioned"); see also id. § 399(k) (stating that one remedy for a principal
whose agent violates a fiduciary duty is the "refusal to pay compensation").
177. Committee on the Resolution of Fee Disputes: Fee Arbitration Rules, supra note 115.
178. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) acts as a gatekeeper to
the court system by issuing a right to sue letter if probable cause is found after an
investigation. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. 754,763 (2002).
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disputant, and the Chairperson from the committee on fee arbitration.
Nonlawyers. This category would include representatives from
business and community entities: former disputant (client), business
owner, representative from another profession, ADR specialist,
malpractice insurer, and a law student.
2. Create or modify a state agency to act as gatekeeper.
This state entity would be comprised of three primary areas:
Grievance Committee. This committee would be comprised of
lawyers, non-lawyers, specialists, and members from other professions.
Independent Counsel. The Independent Counsel would be appointed
by the State Supreme Court, the Bar Association, State Agency, and the
Department of Regulation and Licensing.
Intake Specialist. Individuals serving in this area could include: a
specialist at the Office of Lawyer Regulation, a law clerk, a bar examiner,
an investigator, and/or court commissioners.
3. Enact a procedural system to serve both client and attorney
needs.
Step One: Review written complaint from client
a. Determine if fee dispute is exclusive of other claims
b. Determine if evidence of breach of contract by either party
c. Determine if evidence of legal malpractice
d. Determine if evidence of ethical violations
e. Determine if evidence of violations of law
f. Determine if crime fraud exception applies
g. Determine if issues of confidentiality or waivers apply
Step Two: Seek reply from attorney
a. Gather facts
b. Seek formal answer
c. Raise questions
d. Require sworn statements
e. Require affidavits
f. Require telephone testimony
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4. Address complaints efficiently and in a timely fashion.
This objective could be achieved by various methods: imposing strict
time limitations; efficiently dismissing complaints without merit;
promoting negotiation and mediation; offering and explaining voluntary
arbitration to clients; providing independent assessment; providing a
remuneration certificate; referring the case to the appropriate authority,
and/or issuing a right to sue letter.
5. Improve public awareness and education.
Various steps can be taken to improve public awareness and
education. Some recommendations include: encouraging the discussion
of pre-dispute agreements and ADR clauses; heightening consumer
awareness about the use of ADR clauses generally; publicizing new and
improved dispute resolution program; publishing and disseminating clear
rules, processes and procedures manual; allowing easy access and
inexpensive access to consumers and lawyers; addressing issues of
fairness, leverage, power imbalance; and seeking consumer input and
feedback.
VII. CONCLUSION
Attorney client disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, a
failure to communicate, allegations of legal malpractice, and violations
of professional responsibility. Because clients perceive limited options,
any method used to resolve disputes between attorneys and clients must
be cognizant of the special trust a client must have for an attorney. Yet,
the current debate among lawyers does not appear to consider the
client's perspective.
Although there may not be a perfect approach, negotiation is
probably the best method for resolving attorney-client disputes.
However, other alternative dispute resolution processes, such as
mediation, should also be considered seriously by both parties seeking
to settle their disputes. The presence of a neutral third party is likely to
facilitate the negotiation process, especially in light of the power
imbalance between attorneys and clients. More importantly, mediation
allows clients to tell their story to someone who will listen and to
become part of the solution. Unlike mandatory binding arbitration or
litigation, mediation does not impose an outcome on either party.
Litigation is probably the least desirable approach for both parties,
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because of the inherent risks of a court-imposed outcome. For similar
reasons, mandatory arbitration is unlikely to resolve disputes in a way
that will enhance or preserve attorney-client relationships. Instead,
making arbitration mandatory and binding is apt to cause as much
bitterness as litigation, especially from the losing party.
When designing a program to resolve attorney-client disputes,
lawyers should seek input from lawyers in other states and other
countries as well as other non-lawyer professionals. All points of view,
including the client's perspective, should be considered when developing
or modifying any system used to resolve attorney-client disputes.
The system should allow attorneys and clients to resolve both fee
disputes and legal malpractice claims, without sacrificing their right to
choose whether to negotiate, mediate, arbitrate, or litigate the dispute.
The system should be based on a model that uses mediation as the main
process of dispute resolution. Lawyers should be encouraged, perhaps
even mandated, to utilize mediation and they should be discouraged
from using the court system to litigate disputes with clients.
Unfortunately, the only leverage some clients have is to take their
complaint to the bar or through the formal lawyer regulation system.
Mediation may alleviate the need for clients to use the formal
system, and it is likely to save time and money for everyone. It has been
noted that "[a] lawyer's advice is his stock in trade." '179 Lawyers must
protect their trade and their time. Defending a complaint is as costly,
time consuming, and as risky as alleging a complaint. The system
developed and implemented should be more economically efficient than
litigation. Mediation saves not only time and money, but it can save
reputations and relationships.
Lawyers must protect their reputations, as individuals and as
members of a profession. Clients view lawyers as trusted custodians of
the legal system, and the job of most lawyers entails helping clients
resolve disputes in a civil, logical, methodical, and professional manner.
Lawyers should be allowed to resolve their own disputes in the same
manner. However, lawyers should treat clients with care and as the
"customers" they are-custodians of repeat and referral business.
179. Fee Arbitration Program, supra note 13.
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